Litigating the Public Sector Equality Duty: The Story So Far by McColgan, A
This is a repository copy of Litigating the Public Sector Equality Duty: The Story So Far.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/150695/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
McColgan, A (2015) Litigating the Public Sector Equality Duty: The Story So Far. Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 35 (3). pp. 453-485. ISSN 0143-6503 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqv021
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an author produced 
version of an article published in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Uploaded in accordance
with the publisher's self-archiving policy. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
  1 
Litigating the Public Sector Equality Duty: the story so far* 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the development and judicial application of the Public Sector 
Equality Duty now found in s149 Equality Act 2010, previously in a variety of forms in 
the Race Relations Act 1976, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975. It identifies a number of emerging themes in the jurisprudence 
concerned, in particular, with the relationship between the PSED and Wednesbury review, 
the extent of the information-gathering obligation it imposes, the delegability of PSED 
decision-making and the timing of PSED challenge. It then considers the uncertainties 
which remain including, in particular, the application of the duty to various categories of 
decision-making, and concludes by assessing the impact of the PSED on challenges to 
´FXWVµFDVHVDULVLQJIURPWKHUHGXFWLRQVWRSXEOLFVHFWRUIXQGLQJDQGRQGRPHVWLF
equality jurisprudence. 
 
Key words: discrimination, equality, Equality Act 2010, Public Sector Equality Duty, 
Judicial Review 
 
1. Introduction 
What has become known as the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) was first 
introduced in Britain in April 2001 by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which 
amended s71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA). Similar duties were introduced by 
amendments to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) in December 2006 and 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) in April 2007, before the implementation of the 
Equality Act 2010 (EqA) introduced from April 2011 a single PSED covering not only 
race, disability and sex (including gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity), but 
also sexual orientation, religion, belief and age.  
In May 2012 the-then (Coalition) Government announced that a review of the PSED 
´DVpart of the outcome of the Red Tape Challenge spotlight on equalities, to establish 
whether [it was] operating as intended.1 That announcement caused concern among 
                                                          
* Aileen McColgan, Barrister, Matrix Chambers; Professor of Human Rights Law, Dickson Poon School of 
/DZ.LQJ·V&ROOHJH/RQGRQ0\WKDQNVWRWKHDQRQ\PRXVUHYLHZHUVRIWKLVSDSHUIRU their helpful 
comments. All errors remain my own. 
1 www.gov.uk/government/policy-advisory-groups/review-of-public-sector-equality-duty-steering-group, 
accessed 9 October 2013. 
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many with an interest in equalities, not least because WKH´,QGHSHQGHQW6WHHULQJ*URXSµ
consisted for the most part of those who might reasonably be regarded as having an 
interest in the evisceration of the duty. The review, published in September 2013, did not 
VXJJHVWDQ\´final MXGJHPHQWDERXWWKHLPSDFWRIWKH36('µ but its tone was generally 
KRVWLOHDQGLWLQVLVWHGWKDWSXEOLFERGLHV´PXVWQRWVHHNWR¶JROGSODWH·µ compliance 
(original emphasis).2 A Ministerial statement by the Minister for Women and Equalities, 
Maria Miller MP, agreed with a recommendation that a formal review of the PSED be 
carried out in 2016 and with DUHFRPPHQGDWLRQWKDW´complementary or alternative 
[enforcement] means, other than judicial reviewµRXJKWWREHFRQVLGHUHG.3 This statement 
was made in the midst of *RYHUQPHQW·V concerted attack on judicial review and its 
funding. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the way in which the PSED (by which I refer 
both to the duties imposed by the RRA, SDA and DDA and to that more recently 
introduced by the EqA) has been applied by the courts to date. I do not claim to discuss 
all the PSED cases of which there are now many, much less to do so exhaustively, but I 
will consider the more important of them and will indicate the breadth and nature of the 
cases, together with some of the themes which have emerged from the caselaw.4 
  
2. The current PSED and its predecessors 
Section 149(1) of the EqA requires that SXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV´PXVWLQWKHexercise of [their] 
functions, have due regard toµ the WKUHHVWDWXWRU\QHHGVWRD´eliminate discrimination, 
harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Actµ
E´advance equality of opportunityµDQGF´foster good relations between personsµ
with different protected characteristics.5 The duty applies to private persons exercising 
public functions, in the exercise of those functions (s149(2)). The PSED differs from its 
predecessor provisions in a number of respects but the judicial approach to s149 has 
been on all fours with that taken to the predecessor provisions. 
                                                          
2 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237194/Review_of_the_ 
Public_Sector_Equality_Duty_by_the_Independent_Steering_Group.pdf, accessed 10 October 2013 paras 
12, 15, 18 & 22. 
3 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237215/Public_Sector_ 
Equality_Duty_Review_-_HoC.pdfwww.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment 
_data/file/237215/Public_Sector_ Equality_Duty_Review_-_HoC.pdf 
4 See also my table of PSED cases available at http://www.matrixlaw.co.uk/Members/31/Aileen%20 
McColgan.aspx. 
5 /LVWHGDWVDV´age; disability; gender reassignment; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; 
VH[>DQG@VH[XDORULHQWDWLRQµ 
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The PSED had its legislative precursor in Great Britain6 in s71 RRA which imposed 
GXWLHVRQORFDODXWKRULWLHVDORQH´to make appropriate arrangements with a view to 
securing that their various functions are carried out with due regard to the need ³ (a) to 
eliminate unlawful racial discrimination; and (b) to promote equality of opportunity, and 
JRRGUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQSHUVRQVRIGLIIHUHQWUDFLDOJURXSVµ The precedents were not 
promising. There are no decisions in which s71, prior to its amendment by the 2000 Act, 
founded a judicial review challenge to a public authority, attempts by such authorities to 
rely on the duty as a basis for anti-apartheid actions having been rejected on a number of 
occasions.7  
Section 71 RRA was amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which 
was passed in the wake of the 0DF3KHUVRQLQTXLU\·V5HSRUWand which introduced a new 
s19B into the RRA which prohibited race discrimination in the carrying out of public 
functions.8 A provision imposing positive obligations on public bodies was introduced by 
Lord Lester by way of a Liberal Democrat amendment to the Bill in the House of Lords 
on 13 January 2000,9 and on 26 January 2000 Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that 
the government would include a statutory duty on public authorities to promote equality 
LQWKH%LOO´leaving room for consultation on how the duty will operate in practice and 
KRZLWZLOOEHHQIRUFHGµ10  
After its amendment by the 2000 Act, s71 required that every body listed in Schedule 
$RIWKH$FW´shall, in carrying out its functions, have due regard to the need³ (a) to 
eliminate unlawful racial discrimination [11]; and (b) to promote equality of opportunity 
and good relations between persons of different racial groupsµ. The amendment of s71 
did not at first generate any litigation and a Formal Investigation carried out by the CRE 
in 2006 found that only 42.4% of local authorities had carried out any race equality 
impact assessments in the preceding four years.12 The PSED was, according to John 
Halford (the solicitor responsible for the Elias case, discussed below)´FRQVLGHUHGD
white elephant by many discrimination lawyers and little more than a target duty by their 
                                                          
6 Cf Northern Ireland Act 1998 s 75. 
7 Wheeler v Leicester CC [1985] AC 1054; R v Lewisham LBC Ex p. Shell UK [1988] 1 All ER 938. 
8 Previously, by reason of the decision of the House of Lords in R v Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, ex p 
Amin [1983] 2 AC 818 on the materially identical provisions of the SDA, public authorities were only 
bound by the RRA when they exercised functions equivalent to those of private bodies, and not when they 
ZHUHHQJDJHGLQWKHDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH´VWDWHµDVVXFK 
9 Ibid vol 608, col 773-788. 
10 See Race Relations Amendment Bill (HL) Bill, Commons Library Research Paper http://www. 
parliament.uk/briefing -papers/RP00-27 p.24, accessed 7 October 2013. 
11 $IWHU2FWREHU´GLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGYLFWLPLVDWLRQµ 
12 CRE Common Ground (London: CRE, 2006) para 3.2.4a. 
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publiFODZFRXQWHUSDUWVµ13  
 
3. The Early Caselaw 
The first hint that the PSED might have real teeth came in July 2005 when the-then Elias 
J ruled, in R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence, that the defendant had breached s71 RRA 
by failing to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination in 
adopting a compensation scheme for former Japanese prisoners of war, further that this 
breach was relevant to the justification of the indirect race discrimination he accepted 
that the scheme involved.14 The Court of Appeal in the same case declared (albeit obiter), 
and despite the relative absence of change in s71(1) itself15 from its original (s71) to its 
DPHQGHGVIRUPWKDWWKH´FOHDUSXUSRVHµRIWKHGXWLHVLPSRVHGE\WKH55$ODWHU
E\WKH6'$DQG''$ZDV´WRUHTXLUHSXEOLFERGLHVWRZKRPWKDWSURYLVLRQDSSOLHVWR
JLYHDGYDQFHFRQVLGHUDWLRQWRLVVXHVRI«GLVFULPLQDWLRQbefore making any policy 
GHFLVLRQWKDWPD\EHDIIHFWHGE\WKHPµ16   
The compensation scheme challenged in Elias excluded from entitlement those 
British subjects who had not been born (and whose parents and grandparents had not 
been born) in the UK. Elias J ruled that, in view of the ´REYLRXVGLVFULPLQDWRU\HIIHFWRI
WKLVVFKHPHµ, s71 required that the Secretary of State consider in advance of adopting it 
whether any discriminatory effect was justifiable.17 Further, the judge accepted that ´the 
failure on behalf of the defendant apparently even to appreciate the potentially 
discriminatory nature of the scheme also made it harder for him now to establish 
justificationµLQUHVSHFWRIa claim of indirect discrimination pursued by the claimant.18 
Arden LJ then stated, obiter, in the Court of Appeal that the PSED ZDV´an integral and 
important part of the mechanisms for ensuring the fulfilment of the aims of anti-
discrimination legislationµDQGWKDWLWZDV´not possible to take the view that the 
Secretary of State·s non-compliance with that provision was not a very important 
matterµ19 
The importance of the decisions in Elias cannot easily be over-stated. Prior to the 
judgment of Elias J there was little to distinguish s 71(1) from its predecessor provision 
and scant reason to regard it as having potentially significant impact. After his judgment, 
                                                          
13 ´6WDWXWRU\GXWLHVDQGWKH3XEOLF/DZ&RXUWVµJudicial Review 89. 
14 [2005] EWHC 1435 (Admin) [2005] IRLR 788.  
15 As distinct from the supportive specific duties and the enforcement mechanisms therefor. 
16 [2006] EWCA Civ 1293; [2006] IRLR 934 [274]. 
17 Fn 12 para 98. 
18 Cf his decision as Elias LJ in Coll v SSJ [2015] EWCA Civ 328. 
19 Fn 16. 
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DQGWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDO·VHQGRUVHPHQWRILWthe PSED became an extremely valuable 
tool in the toolkit of public lawyers and radically altered the parameters of 
´GLVFULPLQDWLRQODZµin British law. 
Another early indication of the importance of s71 RRA was R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department in which Stanley Burnton J, as he then was, found 
that changes to the regime for training international medical students in the UK had been 
made in breach of the PSED,20 although he declined to quash the rule change in light of 
an equality impact assessment (EIA) subsequently carried out by the defendants. The 
Court of Appeal was asked to rule on other aspects of the decision and Sedley LJ took 
the opportunity to state, albeit obiter, at [3] that the withholding of relief below ´GRHVQRW
in any way diminish the importance of compliance with s.71, not as rearguard action 
following a concluded decision but as an essential preliminary to any such decision. 
,QDWWHQWLRQWRLWLVERWKXQODZIXODQGEDGJRYHUQPHQW,WLVWKH+RPH2IILFH·VJRRG
fortune that the eventual assessment did not force it to go back to WKHGUDZLQJERDUGµ21 
The following year, in R(C) v Secretary of State for Justice, in which the Court of Appeal 
quashed amendments to the Secure Training Centre (Amendment) Rules 2007 which had 
been implemented without any analysis of their likely racial impact,22 Buxton LJ declared, 
for the Court, WKDW´[a]lthough here characterised as a procedural defectµWKHGHIHQGDQW·V
IDLOXUHWRFRQGXFWDQ(,$´is a defect in following a procedure that is of very great 
substantial, and not merely technical, importance, as the observations of Arden and 
Sedley LJJ make clear. It continues to be of the first importance to mark that failure by 
DQDSSURSULDWHRUGHUµ23 
Elias, BAPIO and C all concerned s71(1) RRA. Section 49A DDA, which came into 
effect in December 2005, UHTXLUHGWKDW´GXHUHJDUGµEHSDLGWR a wider range of statutory 
needs including (s49A(d)) ´WKHQHHGWRWDNHVWHSVWRWDNHDFFRXQWRIGLVDEOHGSHUVRQV·
disabilities, even where that involves treating disabled persons more favourably than 
other personsµThe first s49A DDA decision was made in Eisai Ltd v National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), in which the High Court considered a challenge to a 
decision of NICE to the effect that a particular drug was not cost efficient in the 
                                                          
20 [2007] EWHC 199 (QB).  
21 [2007] EWCA Civ 1139 [3]. 
22 [2008] EWCA Civ 882; [2009] QB 657. 
23 Ibid, [54]. See also R (HA (Nigeria)) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 979 (Admin) [200]. Cf Barnsley MBC v Norton 
[2011] EWCA Civ 834 and R (Hurley & Moore) v SSBIS [2012] EWHC 201 (Admin), R (RB) v Devon [2012] 
EWHC 3597 (Admin) and R (E) v Governing Body of the Jews Free School & Ors [2008] EWHC 1535 (Admin) 
[2008] ELR 445 [214], in which only declaratory relief was granted.   
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WUHDWPHQWRIPLOGWRPRGHUDWH$O]KHLPHU·V'LVHDVHPHDVXUHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRSDUWLFXODU
assessment criteria.24 The High Court (Dobbs J) accepted that the defendant had 
breached s49A by failing adequately to consider the fact that the assessment criteria were 
flawed in their application to, inter alia, people with marked language problems, and those 
whose first language was not English.  
Shortly after the decision in Eisai, the High Court considered what was to be the first 
of WKHPDQ\36('´FXWVFKDOOHQJHVµ. The defendant in R (Chavda) v Harrow LBC had 
decided to ration adult care services to those whose carHQHHGVZHUHGHHPHG´FULWLFDOµ.25 
$Q´HTXDOLWLHVLPSDFWDVVHVVPHQWµKDGEHHQFDUULHGRXWZKLFKUHFRJQLVHGWKHSRWHQWLDO
for disparate impact on those with dLVDELOLWLHVEXWWKHUHKDGEHHQ´QRHIIRUWSURDFWLYHO\
to seek the views of the disabled or to refer to the duty in the planning stages of the 
FRQVXOWDWLRQµDQGQRFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI´ZKDWPHDVXUHVFRXOGEHWDNHQWRDYRLG
GLVDGYDQWDJHWRWKHGLVDEOHGµ26 Judge Mackie QC, sitting in the Administrative Court, 
stressed the importance of the PSED, and remarked that WKHUHZDV´no evidence that 
th[e] legal duty and its implications were drawn to the attention of the decision-takers 
who should have been informed not just of the disabled as an issue but of the particular 
obligations which the law imposesµDQGWKDWDQ´REOLTXHµUHIHUHQFHLQWKH
GRFXPHQWDWLRQSURYLGHGWRWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHUVWR´SRWHQWLDOFRQIOLFWZLWKWKH''$µ
ZDVLQVXIILFLHQWDVLW´would not give a busy councillor any idea of the serious duties 
imposed upon the council by the Actµ. +HZHQWRQWRVWDWHWKDW´>W@he council could not 
weigh matters properly in the balance >IRUWKHSXUSRVHRISD\LQJ´GXHUHJDUGµWRWKHP@ 
without being aware of what its duties wereµDQGWKDWLWZDV´not enough to accept that 
the council has a good disability record and assume that somehow the message would 
have got acrossµ. 27  
Among the other influential early PSED decisions was that in R (Baker & Others) v 
SSCLG, a s71 RRA challenge to the decision of a planning inspector.28 The inspector had 
upheld a refusal of planning permission to Irish Travellers to build on Green Belt land, 
having followed a process which involved weighing the harm to the Green Belt against a 
YDULHW\RIFRQVLGHUDWLRQVZKLFKIDYRXUHGWKHFODLPDQWV·FDVH LQFOXGLQJWKHLU´J\SV\VWDWXVµ
                                                          
24 [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin), 98 BMLR 70. The Court of Appeal decision ([2008] EWCA Civ 438, 101 
BMLR 26) does not deal with the PSED. 
25 [2007] EWHC 3064 (Admin) [2008] LGR 657. Presenting adults have to have their needs rated critical, 
substantial, moderate or low with authorities having a discretion to determine the threshold at which care 
is provided. 
26 Ibid [36]. 
27 Ibid [40]. 
28 [2008] EWCA Civ 141, [2008] LGR 239. 
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and the disadvantage associated with it, taking into account guidance which incorporated 
a commitment to equality for members of the gypsy and traveller communities. The-then 
Dyson LJ, with whom May LJ and Sir Robin Auld agreed, emphasised that s71 RRA did 
not impose ´a duty to achieve a result, namely to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination 
or to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different 
racial groupsµEXWUDWKHU´a duty to have due regard to the need to achieve these goalsµ
)XUWKHU´GXHUHJDUGµZDV´the regard that is appropriate in all the circumstancesµ
LQFOXGLQJ´on the one hand the importance of the areas of life of the members of the 
disadvantaged racial group that are affected by the inequality of opportunity and the 
extent of the inequality; and on the other hand, such countervailing factors as are 
UHOHYDQWWRWKHIXQFWLRQZKLFKWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHULVSHUIRUPLQJµ 29 Dyson LJ went on to 
GHFODUHWKDW´8OWLPDWHO\KRZPXFKZHLJKW[the Planning Inspector] gave to the various 
factors was a matter for her planning judgment.µ 30 He UHMHFWHGWKHDUJXPHQWWKDW´D
person does not perform the s 71(1) duty unless he demonstrates by the language in 
ZKLFKKHH[SUHVVHVKLVGHFLVLRQWKDWKHLVFRQVFLRXVWKDWKHLVGLVFKDUJLQJWKHGXW\µ
agreeing with the dicta of Ouseley J in R (Smith) v South Norfolk Council31 that the 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQUHTXLUHGE\WKH36('´FDQEHFDUULHGRXWZLWKRXWWKHVHFWLRQEHLQJ
referred to provided that the aspects to which it is addressed are considered, and due 
UHJDUGLVSDLGWRWKHP«µDQGVWDWHGWKDW´[t]he question in every case is whether the 
decision-maker has in substance had due regard to the relevant statutory needµ.32 
Baker is one of the most frequently cited PSED decisions. Equally influential is that of 
the Divisional Court in R (Brown) v SSWP, an unsuccessful challenge to post office 
closures,33 in which Aikens LJ, with whom Scott Baker LJ agreed, adopted the Baker 
approach and went on to distil the now well-known six principles from the caselaw. In 
short summary, these required (1) that decision-makers must be aware of the duty of due 
regard;  (2) which ´must be fulfilled before and at the time that a particular policy « is 
being considered by the public authority in questionµ, a process which ´involves a 
conscious approach and state of mLQGµUDWKHUWKDQex post facto justification; (3) that the 
duty ´must be exercised in substance, with rigour and with an open mindµDQGPXVWEH
´integrated within the discharge of the public functions of the authority. It is not a 
                                                          
29 Ibid [31]. 
30 Ibid [34], [36]. 
31 [2006] EWHC 2772 (Admin). 
32 Fn 28 [35], [37]. Dyson LJ went on to acknowledge at [38] that express reference to the PSED was good 
practice.  
33 [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin), [2009] PTSR 1506. 
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TXHVWLRQRI¶ticking boxes· and failure to mention the PSED as such is not fatal; (4) that 
the duty is non-delegable though practical steps to fulfil it may be taken by others under 
proper supervision; (5) that it is continuing; and (6) that it is good practice to keep 
records on PSED compliance.34 
 
4. Emerging Issues 
A number of issues have emerged from the caselaw to date. These will be considered in 
turn. 
 
(1) +RZPXFKUHJDUGLV´GXHµ"´GXHUHJDUGµDQG:HGQHVEXU\ 
In the early cases PSED challenges frequently succeeded because public authorities had 
flagrantly failed to pay any attention to the equality implications of their actions. In R 
(Kaur) v Ealing LBC, for example, the High Court ruled that the defendant had breached 
s71 RRA when it decided, without any analysis of the race equality implications, to 
UHSODFH´WDUJHWHGµIXQGLQJSUHYLRXVO\SURYLGHGWR6RXWKDOO%ODFN6LVWHUVWRZRUNZLWK
women experiencing domestic violence with funds to be awarded to a provider who 
would provide services to all individuals experiencing domestic violence within the 
borough.35 The evidence was that BME women were less likely to access services from a 
´JHQHULFµSURYLGHU0RVHV/-found that WKHGHIHQGDQWKDGIDLOHGWKURXJKRXW´to assess 
the impact on black minority ethnic womenµRILWVDSSURDFKand ruled that the Council 
KDGQRWEHHQHQWLWOHGWRUHDFKDGHFLVLRQRQIXQGLQJ´FRQWLQJHQWRQµWKHUHVXOWVRIDQ
EIA still to be undertaken.36 ,WZDVVDLGKLV/RUGVKLS´unlawful to adopt a policy 
contingent on an assessmentµDQGWKHVXJJHVWLRQWRWKHFRQWUDU\´VPDFN>HG@«RI
policy-based evidence rather than evidence-based policy...µ37 
Such cases still occur.38 More common, however, is the situation in which some 
UHJDUGKDVEHHQSDLGDQGWKHLVVXHEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHVLVZKHWKHUVXFKUHJDUGLV´GXHµ
i.e., sufficient. In R (Meany) v Harlow DC, for example, a PSED challenge was brought to 
                                                          
34 [90]-[96]. The Brown formula was approved by the Court of Appeal in R (Domb) v Hammersmith and 
Fulham LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 941 [2009] LGR 843. Lengthier analyses have been adopted subsequently, 
for example by McCombe LJ in Bracking [2013] EWCA Civ 1345 [2014] EqLR 60 [26], but the Brown 
formula is still regularly cited with approval.  
35 [2008] EWHC 2062 (Admin). 
36 Ibid [24]. 
37 Ibid [35], [37]. See also Watkins-Singh [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin), [2008] 3 FCR 203 and Elias fns 14 
and 16, E v JFS and EISAI fn 24, and JL v Islington [2009] EWHC 458 (Admin), [2009] 2 FLR 515, the last 
of which is discussed below.  
38 Relatively recent examples include R (Medical Justice) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1710 and R (Luton BC & 
Ors) v SS Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin), [2011] LGR 553. 
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WKHGHIHQGDQW·V decision to reduce funding to welfare advice services.39 Davis J (as he 
then was) rejected the argument put for the defendant that the claimant ´HLWKHUKDGWR
VKRZWKDWQRUHJDUGZDVKDGWRWKHVWDWXWRU\FULWHULDRUWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQZDVLUUDWLRQDOµ40 
and UXOHGWKDW´the question of due regard requires a review by the court... how much 
weight is to be given to the countervailing factors is a matter for the decision maker. But 
that does not abrogate the obligation on the decision maker in substance first to have 
regard to the statutory criteria on discriminationµ.41 The defendant had had some regard 
to the statutory needs, but had not weighed them in the balance against the 
countervailing factors on which it relied.42 In particular, while it was arguable that 
sufficient regard was had to the statutory duties in respect of a budget cut of 50% (this 
having been one of the options on the table), there was nothing to show that any due 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHVWDWXWRU\FULWHULDLQUHVSHFWRIDUHGXFWLRQRI«ZDVJLYHQ,W
ZDVLQHIIHFWDOOWUHDWHGDVRQHµ43 
7KHDPRXQWRIUHJDUGZKLFKLV´GXHµZLOOYDU\ZLWKWKHIDFWV,QR (Hajrula) v London 
Councils the claimants successfully challenged a decision of the defendant to withdraw 
funding from the Roma Support Group because the defendant had failed to consider the 
impact on protected groups early enough in the process.44 Calvert Smith J, quashing the 
IXQGLQJGHFLVLRQUXOHGWKDW´,QDFDVHZKHUHODUJHQXPEHUVRIYXOQHUDEOHSHRSOHPDQ\
of whom fall within one or more of the protected groups, are affected, the due regard 
QHFHVVDU\LVYHU\KLJKµ.45 
A particular question which has arisen in a number of cases concerns the relationship 
EHWZHHQWKHREOLJDWLRQWRSD\´GXHUHJDUGµWRWKHYDULRXVVWDWXWRU\QHHGVDQGWKH
application of the Wednesbury test. Davis J·V rejection of the Wednesbury approach in Meany 
was relied upon by Judge Jarman QC in R (Boyejo) v Barnet LBC in dismissing the 
GHIHQGDQW·Vargument WKDWWKHFODLPDQWV´PXVWVKRZDQDEVHQFHRIGXHUHJDUGLQWKH
Wednesbury VHQVHRIXQUHDVRQDEOHQHVVµ and FRQFOXGLQJWKDW´WKHWednesbury test applies 
to the consideration of the countervailing factors there referred to, but not to the 
question of whether the necessary due regard has been hadµ (emphasis added).46 
´5eferences in the documentation before the decision makers in each case to disabilities 
                                                          
39 [2009] EWHC 559 (Admin). 
40 Ibid [72]. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid [78]. 
43 Ibid [81]. 
44 [2011] EWHC 448 (Admin). 
45 Ibid [69]. 
46 [2009] EWHC 3261 (Admin), [56]. 
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or to rights of equality do not fulfil the requirement of such recognition. Nor does a 
general awareness amongst officers or decision-makers of the duty under s 49A(1).µ47  
The debate appears to have been settled by the Divisional Court in R (Hurley & Anor) 
v SSBIS, the tuition fees challenge, in which Elias LJ stated for the Court WKDW´«the 
decision maker must be clear precisely what the equality implications are when he puts 
them in the balance, and he must recognise the desirability of achieving them, but 
ultimately it is for him to decide what weight they should be given in the light of all 
relevant factors µ.48 In R (Williams & Anor) v Surrey CC, a library cuts case, Wilkie J 
suggested Hurley & Moore involved a two stage approach, the first asking the non-
Wednesbury TXHVWLRQ´whether the authority has, in fact, surmounted the threshold 
required by the statuteµDQGWKHVHFRQGrequiring the application of a Wednesbury 
approach to the balance struck by the decision maker between equality considerations 
DQG´all the other relevant (possibly countervailing) factorsµ. 49 
Notwithstanding the role of Wednesbury LQWKHVFUXWLQ\RISXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV·
compliance with the PSED, the duty is a rigorous one. As set out in Brown and 
subsequently, the court does not reach the Wednesbury question until it has satisfied itself 
that the decision considered WKH´VSHFLILFJRDOVLQSOD\DQG>DQDO\VH@WKHUHOHYDQWPDWHULDO
ZLWKWKRVHJRDOVLQPLQGµZLWK´ULJRXUDQGDQRSHQPLQGµ´EHIRUHRUDWWKHWLPHWKH
SDUWLFXODUSROLF\LVFRQVLGHUHGµDV´¶DQHVVHQWLDOSUHOLPLQDU\·WRDQ\LPSRUWDQWSRlicy 
GHFLVLRQQRWD¶UHDUJXDUGDFWLRQIROORZLQJDFRQFOXGHGGHFLVLRQ·µLWEHLQJLQVXIILFLHQW
that WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHUKDG´a mere general awareness of the dutyµDVGLVWLQFWIURP´D
FRQVFLRXVGLUHFWLQJRIWKHPLQGWRWKHREOLJDWLRQVµ.50 Having said this, the role of judicial 
review is to police the boundaries of decision-making by public authorities and not to 
step into the shoes of the decision-makers.  
All that having been said, a trenchant, reminder of the limits to the judicial function in 
the particular context of the PSED was issued by the Divisional Court in R (MA & Ors) 
v SSWP.51 Dealing with a challenge to the imposition of a cap on housing benefits (the 
´EHGURRPWD[µ, Laws LJ UXOHGWKDW´Where the protected characteristics specified in s 
149 of the 2010 Act are potentially affected by a forthcoming public measure, the 
decision-maker is obliged to conduct a rigorous examination of the measure·s effects, 
                                                          
47 Ibid [63]. See also JM & NT v Isle of Wight Council [2011] EWHC 2911 (Admin) [104]. 
48 Fn 23 [77]-[78], citing Dyson LJ in Baker.  
49 [2012] EWHC 867 (QB) [24]. See similarly R (D) v Worcestershire CC [2013] EWHC 2490 (Admin). 
50 D v Worcestershire ibid [95(iii)] citing the decisions in R (Harris) v LB Haringey [2010] EWCA Civ 703, 
[2010] LGR 713, [40], Brown fn 33, [92], BAPIO (CA) fn 20 and Meany fn 39 [74]. 
51 [2013] EWHC 2213 (QB). 
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including due enquiry where that is necessary >EXW@« does not, however, have to 
undertake a minute examination of every possible impact and ramificationµFLWLQJthe 
decisions of the Court of Appeal in R (Bailey & Ors) v Brent LBC52 and in the Greenwich 
case WRWKHHIIHFWWKDW´¶The courts must ensure that they do not micro-manage the 
H[HUFLVH·µ.53 Laws LJ went on to adopt the statement of HHJ Keyser QC in Copson that 
´[t]he public sector equality duty is not a back door by which challenges to the merits of 
GHFLVLRQVPD\EHPDGHµ54 DQGWRVWUHVVWKDW´WKHGLVFLSOLQHRIWKH36('OLHVLQWKH
required quality, not the outcome, of the decision-PDNLQJSURFHVVµ55 This, in his view: 
´reflects a more general constitutional balance. Much of our modern law, judge-
made and statutory, makes increasing demands on public decision-makers in the 
name of liberal values: the protection of minorities, equality of treatment, non-
discrimination, and the quietus of old prejudices. The law has been enriched 
accordingly. But it is not generally for the courts to resolve the controversies 
which this insistence involves. That is for elected government. The cause of 
constitutional rights is not best served by an ambitious expansion of judicial 
territory, for the courts are not the proper arbiters of political controversy. In this 
sense judicial restraint is an ally of the s 149 duty, for it keeps it in its proper 
place, which is the process and not the outcome of public decisions. I would with 
respect underline what was said by Elias LJ at para 78 in Hurley, rejecting a 
submission for the Claimants that it was for the court to determine whether 
DSSURSULDWHZHLJKWKDVEHHQJLYHQWRWKHGXW\¶LWZRXOGDOORZXQHOHFWHGMXGJHVWR
review on substantive merits grounds almost all aspects of public decision 
makingµ. 
 
The &RXUWRI$SSHDOXSKHOGWKH'LYLVLRQDO&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQ, accepting per Lord Dyson 
MR that ´the Secretary of State well understood that there are some disabled persons 
who, by reason of their disabilities, have a need for more space than is deemed to be 
required by their non-disabled peersµDQG´did have due regard to his statutory dutiesµ
WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRI´the serious impact that the bedroom criteria would have on disabled 
personsµEHLQJ´why so much effort was devoted to seeking a solution to the 
problemµ.56  
 
(2) Information gathering 
Wednesbury applies to the weighing of the various factors by the decision maker but the 
question whether adequate steps have been taken to take account of the equality 
                                                          
52 [2011] EWCA Civ 1586, [2012] LGR 530. 
53 Respectively [2011] EWCA Civ 1586 [2012] LGR 530, [77[-[83] & [102] and [2012] EWCA Civ 496, per 
Elias LJ [30]. 
54 [2013] EWHC 732 (Admin) [57(4)] cited at [73]. 
55 Ibid [74]. 
56 [2014] EWCA Civ 13 [92]. 
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implications of decision-making is a hard-edged one. Of particular significance is the 
question whether the decision maker has been provided with adequate information on 
which to undertake the required balancing exercise. In R (Lunt) v Liverpool CC Blake J 
ruled WKDWD´ODZIXOH[HUFLVHRIGLVFUHWLRQFRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQSHUIRUPHGXQOHVVWKH
[decision makHU@SURSHUO\XQGHUVWRRGWKHSUREOHPLWVGHJUHHDQGH[WHQWµ57 The 
defendant was found to have breached s49A DDA when it failed to take into account 
the implications for users of particular types of wheelchair of refusing to approve a new 
taxi which was suitable for those wheelchairs. The decision had been based in part on a 
mistaken view of the facts. The judge ruled the implications for wheelchair users were a 
mandatory relevant consideration under both s49A and, importantly, the common law. 
The importance of adequate evidence gathering was again emphasised in Rahman v 
Birmingham CC in which Blake J ruled that the defendant had failed to pay due regard to 
the statutory duties imposed by s 49A DDA when it decided to stop funding particular 
types of adult services.58 The defendant had relied on an equalities impact assessment the 
FRQWHQWRIZKLFK´VHHP>HG@WRKDYHEHHQGULYHQE\WKHKRSHVRIWKHDGYDQWDJHVWREH
derived from a new policy rather than focussing upon the assessment of the degree of 
disadvantage to existing users of terminating funding arrangements until new 
DUUDQJHPHQWVFDQEHSXWLQSODFHµ7KHDVVHVVPHQWZDVQRWEDVHGRQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWK
WKRVHZKRZRXOGEHDIIHFWHGE\WKHSROLF\DQG´ZRXOGKDYHEHHQEHVWSODFHGWRH[SODLQ
the consequences of termination of funding in the absence of satisfactory alternative 
SURYLVLRQRUVHUYLFHXVHUVµDQGZDVDQLQDGHTXDWHEDVLVIRUWKHGHFLVLRQEDVHGRQLW59 
In R (W) v Birmingham CC Walker J ruled that the defendant had failed to comply with 
s 49A DDA because, despite an extensive equality impact assessment of a proposed 
restriction of council-IXQGHGFDUHWRWKRVHZKRVHQHHGVZHUHDGMXGJHGWREH´FULWLFDOµ
(UDWKHUWKDQ´VXEVWDQWLDOµRU´PRGHUDWHµLWKDGIDLOHGWRDVVHVV´WKHSUDFWLFDOLPSDFW>of 
WKHUHVWULFWLRQ@RQWKRVHZKRVHQHHGVLQDSDUWLFXODUUHVSHFWIHOOLQWRWKH¶VXEVWDQWLDO·
EDQGEXWQRWLQWRWKH¶FULWLFDO·EDQGµ60 And in R (Green) v Gloucestershire CC the High 
Court (HHJ McKenna) ruled against the defendants in library closures because the EIAs 
on which the decisions were based were superficial and failed properly to analyse the 
potential for disparate impact of library closures or reductions in opening hours on 
                                                          
57 [2009] EWHC 2356 (Admin), [2010] 1 CMLR 43, [44.1]. 
58 [2011] EWHC 944 (Admin), [2011] EqLR 705. And see Blake & Ors v LB Waltham Forest [2014] EWHC 
1027 (Admin) [59]-[72]. 
59 Ibid [35]. 
60 [2011] EWHC 1147 (Admin), [2012] LGR 1 [176]. 
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people with disabilities and women (particularly single mothers).61 The regard which had 
been had, accordingly, was OHVVWKDQWKDWZKLFKZDV´GXHµ62  
The requirement that the decision-maker be armed with adequate relevant 
information is useful in requiring those who advise decision-makers to spell out very 
clearly the potential costs to the vulnerable of their decisions, an obligation which tends 
to run counter to political imperatives to avoid such hostages to fortune. The 
requirement that decision makers be furnished with information as to the implications of 
their potential decisions is not, of course, unlimited, the duty imposed by the PSED 
EHLQJRQO\WRSD\VXFKUHJDUGDVLV´GXHµ In Bailey v Brent LBC, for example, the Court of 
Appeal rejected a s 149 EA challenge to library closures which was based on the failure 
of the defendant to analyse the potentially discriminatory impact of the closures on Asian 
residents who were disproportionately heavy users of libraries.63 Davis LJ, with whom 
5LFKDUGV/-DJUHHGVXPPDULVHGWKHFODLPDQW·V36('FRPSODLQWDVUHODWLQJWRWKHDOOHJHG
IDLOXUHRIWKHGHIHQGDQWWR´¶DQDO\VH·«WKHVLWXDWLRQWKHUDZLQIRUPDWLRQZDVWKere « 
so far as potential indirect discrimination with regard to Asians was concerned, but had 
not been sufficiently assessed«µ.64 In his view, and bearing in mind the difficulties in 
GHWHUPLQLQJ´how such an investigation could, realistically and sensibly, be undertaken by 
WKHFRXQFLODPRQJVWWKHYDULRXVJURXSLQJVFROOHFWLYHO\FDWHJRULVHGDV¶$VLDQ·µ65 ´an air of 
unreality has descended over this particular line of attack. Councils cannot be expected to 
speculate on or to investigate or to explore such matters ad infinitum; nor can they be 
expected to apply, indeed they are to be discouraged from applying, the degree of 
forensic analysis for the purpose of an EIA and of consideration of their duties under s 
ZKLFKD4&PLJKWGHSOR\LQFRXUW«µ66 
                                                          
61 [2011] EWHC 2687 (Admin), [2012] LGR 330 [121]-[127]. 
62 Ibid [129], [130]-[131]. See similarly JM & NT v Isle of Wight Council fn 47, [121]. The EIAs in the W and 
Isle of Wight cases were critical despite the absence of any statutory obligation for the production of those 
documents because they contained the information on which the decision makers based their decisions. 
Where this information is gleaned from additional or alternative sources, any shortcomings in (or absence 
of) an EIA will not be determinative of the discharge of the PSED: see for example D v Worcestershire fn 49 
[99]-[100]. 
63 Fn 52. See also R (Primrose) v SS Justice [2008] EWHC 1625 (Admin); R (Brooke) v SS Justice [2009] EWHC 
1396 (Admin) (DC). 
64 Ibid [94]. 
65 Ibid [100].  See, somewhat similarly, R (Coleman) v Barnet LBC [2012] All ER (D) 256 (Dec) in which 
Lindblom J ruled that the defendant had not been required to go beyond the relevant categories of 
protected characteristics (age and disability) by disaggregating the several types of disability and giving 
separate treatment to physical, mental and learning disabilities, or to different types of physical disability 
from another. 
66 Ibid [102]. See also R (Dudley MBC) v SSCLG [2012] EWHC 1729 (Admin), [2013] LGR 68, [85], [88] & 
[89]. In the Greenwich case fn 53 [30] Elias LJ accepted that (OLDV/-TXDOLILHGWKHVWDWHPHQWWKDW´It is only 
if a characteristic or combination of characteristics is likely to arise in the exercise of the public function 
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The extent of the duty to gather information was also in issue in CPAG v SSWP, 
which involved a challenge to the imposition of limits on housing benefit the effect of 
which was to disadvantage single parent and large families resident in the South East (in 
particular, London) which were disproportionately likely to be headed by a woman and 
to be BME respectively.67 It was asserted that the defendant had failed to comply with 
the PSED, in particular by declining to follow the advice of the Social Security Advisory 
Committee that the cuts should be preceded by a full race EIA, this notwithstanding its 
acknowledgment that the measures might impact disproportionately on some BME 
groups which tended to have larger families. The Government had taken the view that 
´H[WHQVLYHDQDO\VLVRIWKHPHDVXUHVRXWOLQHG«KDVVKRZQWKDWWKHFXPXODWLYHLPSDFWVRI
these measures do not appear to disadvantage one group more disproportionately than 
DQRWKHUµDQGWKDWWKHUHZDVLQSODFH´DUDQJHRIPHDVXUHV«PLWLJDWHWKHLPSDFWVRI
WKHVHFKDQJHVµRQIDPLOLHV´,QDGGLWLRQWKH'HSDUWPHQWIRU:RUN	3HQVLRQVLV
considering the scope for commissioning primary research into the impact of the change 
on particular groups such as large familieVDQGHWKQLFPLQRULW\JURXSV«µ68 
The claimant in CPAG argued that the defendant had failed to take account of 
available statistical information on which it should have concluded that the changes 
would, rather than might, have a significantly disproportionate effect on BME groups. 
The defendant did not accept the statistical basis on which the claimant relied and took 
WKHYLHZWKDW´1HLWKHUWKHDVVHVVPHQWFRQGXFWHGE\WKH&ODLPDQWQRUWKDWFRQGXFWHGE\
DWP has been able to quantify accurately the level of impact on ethnic minority 
JURXSVµ69 Supperstone J rejected the challenge, ruling that the defendant was entitled to 
rely on the data it had available and that the claimant was wrong to assert that the 
GHIHQGDQWRXJKWWRKDYH´FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHPHDVXUHVZDV¶OLNHO\·WR
impact on ethnic minority groups disproportionately (still less the Defendant could 
DFFXUDWHO\KDYHDVVHVVHGWKHSHUFHQWDJHDPRXQWRIDQ\VXFKOLNHO\LPSDFWµ 
Mr Justice Supperstone took a similar approach in R (B & Ors) v Sheffield CC in which 
he rejected a PSED challenge to WKHGHIHQGDQW·V decision to reduce Council Tax.70 The 
&RXQFLO·V(,$KDGDVVHVVHGWKHLPSDFWOHYHOLQUHODWLRQWR¶$JH·(in particular, on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
WKDWWKH\QHHGWREHWDNHQLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQµZLWKWKHREVHUYDWLRQWKDW´WKHUHPD\EHFDVHVZhere that 
possibility exists in which case there may be a need for further investigation before that characteristic can 
EHLJQRUHGµ 
67 [2011] EWHC 2616 (Admin). 
68 Ibid, [53]. 
69 Ibid, [62]. 
70 [2013] EWHC 512 (Admin). 
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children) DV¶+LJK·DQGWKDWLQUHODWLRQWRGLVDELOLW\DV¶PHGLXP·PDNLQJUHIHUHQFHWRWKH
GHYHORSPHQWRIDQDGGLWLRQDOKDUGVKLSVFKHPH7KHMXGJHDFFHSWHGWKHGHIHQGDQW·V
DUJXPHQWWKDW´WKHLPSDFWRQFKLOGUHQFDQQRWEHGLYRUFHGIURPWKHSRVLWLRQRI
households in which they live. There is no separate impact in relation to children that 
FRXQFLOVVKRXOGKDYHFRQVLGHUHGVHSDUDWHO\µ+HWKHQUHMHFWHGWKHFODLPDQW·VVXEPLVVLRQ
that the decisions in W v Birmingham and Isle of Wight FDVHV´UHTXLUHG the Council to 
identify the number of children and disabled persons affected by the proposal, to analyse 
the impact of the proposal on them and to consider whether any negative impact could 
EHDYRLGHGRUPLWLJDWHGµ´7KHLPSDFWRIWKHSURSRVDORQSHUVRQVZKRVKDUHDUHOHYDQW
protected characteristic is not uniform, rather it depends on individual circumstances.  
Some families with children will be able to meet the proportion of their liability more 
HDVLO\WKDQRWKHUVµ7KHGHIHQGDQWZDV´HQWLWOHGWRFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHLPSDFWRQGLVabled 
people and children was not uniform; and that in the circumstances the creation and 
RSHUDWLRQRIWKHKDUGVKLSIXQGLVWKHEHVWZD\WRKHOSWKRVHLQVHYHUHILQDQFLDOKDUGVKLSµ
this regardless of the size of the fund (£500 000 in respect of 34 000 households who 
which would have to pay at least 20% of their council tax rather than, as before, nothing).  
The decision in B v Sheffield is perhaps open to question, the availability of a fund of 
£500 000 to be set against 34 000 households, each with a minimum additional liability 
of around £400 p.a.,71 in the event that they experienced undue levels of hardship 
VPDFNLQJRIWKHYHU\NLQGRI´DGKRFNHU\µWKH36('ZDVLQWHQGHGWRSUHYHQW:KDWHYHU
the rights or wrongs of any individual decision, however, it is clear from that neither the 
PSED nor the caselaw above imposes a blanket obligation on public authorities to 
engage in minute equality analysis of everything that they do.72 Also on this theme, in 
MA & Ors v SSWP, discussed above, Laws LJ rejected WKHFODLPDQW·VDUJXPHQWWKDWthere 
ZDVD´IDLOXUHWRFRQIURQWWKHGLIILFXOWLHVRIWKRVHZKRQHHGODUJHUDFFRPPRGDWLRQ«
WKH5HJXODWLRQ·VLPSDFWRQFKLOGUHQ«QRDQDO\VLVRIGLVDELOLW\-UHODWHGPDWWHUV>RURI@«
the numbers of disabled persons with housing needs which would not be met under the 
new regime [or] «WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHPHDVXUHIRUGLVDEOHGSHRSOHRULQSDUWLFXODU
                                                          
71 Band A Council Tax in Sheffield in 2013 is £992.71 rising to £1,158.17 for Band B, £1,323.62 for Band 
C and £1,489.08 for Band D. 
72 See also R (Zacchaeus 2000 Trust) v SSWP [2013] EWHC 233 (Admin), [2013] PTSR 785; R 
(Buckinghamshire CC & Ors) v SST [2013] EWHC 481 (Admin); Keyu & Ors v SSFCA & Anor [2012] 
EWHC 2445 (Admin) [130] and R (LB Lewisham) v AQA [2013] EWHC 211 (Admin) [148]. These 
decisions emphasise that thHSXUSRVHRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQJDWKHULQJHWFLVWRHQDEOH´GXHUHJDUGµWREHSDLG
to the statutory needs, rather than as an end in itself. 
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IRUWKRVHZLWKPHQWDODQGOHDUQLQJGLIILFXOWLHVµ73 7KHFODLPDQW·VFULWLFLVPVRIWKH
GHIHQGDQW·VDSSURDFKWRWKH36('LQSDUWLFXODUWKHDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWKDG
failed to carU\RXWWKHQHFHVVDU\´ULJRURXVLQYHVWLJDWLRQµLQUHODWLRQWRWKHLPSDFWRIWKH
SROLF\RQFKLOGUHQDQGGLVDEOHGSHRSOHDPRXQWHGWR´DQDWWHPSWWRSHUVXDGHWKHFRXUW
WR¶PLFUR-PDQDJH·WKHSROLF\-PDNLQJSURFHVVµFRQWUDU\WRDXWKRULW\74 ´LWLVQRWWKH
FRXUW·VWDVN¶WRSUHVFULEHIDFW-specific issues which [the Secretary of State] is obliged to 
FRQVLGHULQDQ\JLYHQFDVHLQRUGHUWRVDWLVI\WKHFRXUWLQUHODWLRQWRKLV36('·µDQGWKH
FODLPDQW·VFDVH´ORRNVYHU\OLNHDOLVWREMHFWLRQVWRWKHSROLF\XQGHUWKHJXLse of a litany 
RIPDWWHUVOHIWXQFRQVLGHUHGDOOEXWDQDVVDXOWRQWKHRXWFRPH«UDWKHUWKDQWKH
SURFHVVµ75 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the courts in the CPAG, Sheffield and MA cases were 
not inclined to take too fine a toothcomb to the kind of decision-making there at issue.76 
These decisions might be seen as indicative of a rowing-back on the parts of the courts 
to the PSED. But any conclusion to this effect would be premature in view of the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Bracking in which that Court overturned the decision 
of the High Court and ruled that the Secretary of State had failed to comply with the 
PSED because she had inadequate information before her of the likely impact of closure 
of the Independent Living Fund on the independence of those disabled people in receipt 
of payments from it. McCombe LJ, with whom Kitchin LJ agreed, ruled that there was 
´VLPSO\QRWWKHHYLGHQFHPHUHO\LQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHRIWKH0LQLVWHU·VSRVLWLRQDVD
Minister for Disabled People [original emphasis] and the sketchy references to the impact on 
ILF fund users by way of possible cuts in the care package in some cases, to demonstrate 
«WKDWDIRFXVVHGUHJDUGZDVKDGWRWKHSRWHQWLDOO\YHU\JUDYHLPSDFWXSRQLQGLYLGXDOV
in this group of disabled persons, within the context of the statutory requirements for 
GLVDEOHGSHRSOHDVDZKROHµ)XUWKHUWKHUHZDVQRHYLGHQFHRI0LQLVWHULDOIRFXVRQWKH
specific duties imposed by s149.77 Elias LJ stated at [75] WKDWWKHUHZDV´FRQVLGHUDEOH
IRUFHµLQWKHVXEPLVVLRQPDGHIRUWKHappellant that the documentation placed before 
the Minister: 
                                                          
73 Ibid [76]. 
74 Ibid [86] citing Greenwich fn 53 [30] per Elias LJ. 
75 Ibid. 
76 See also R (FDA & Ors) v SSWP & Anor [2011] EWHC 3175 (Admin), [2012] 3 All ER [90] in which 
FULWLFLVPRIWKHGHIHQGDQW·VLQIRUPDWLRQJDWKHULQJZDVGLVPLVVHGDV´WRRQLWSLFNLQJµZKHUHLWZDV´SODLQ
«WKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWZHOOXQGHUVWRRGWKDWLQEURDGWHUPVPRUHZRPHQZRXOGEHDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWHG
WKDQPHQµDlso R (HC) v SSWP [2013] EWHC 3874 (Admin) [83]. 
77 Fn 34 above, [62], [66]-[67]. 
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´painted what he characterised as a Panglossian view as to the effects of the 
proposed decision on those who would cease to receive payments from the 
fund... [failing to] identif[y] in sufficiently unambiguous terms the inevitable 
and considerable adverse effect which the closure of the fund will have, 
particularly on those who will as a consequence lose the ability to live 
independently. It may be that this is because of a tendency for officials to tell 
the Minister what they thought she would want to hear ² a tendency which, 
as Sedley LJ pointed out in [Domb] must be strenuously resisted. I suspect 
also that part of the problem may be that these documents are for public 
consumption and give the impression that they have been drafted with at 
least half an eye to sending an up-beat message about the merits of the 
policy. This necessarily involves down-playing the adverse effects of the 
decision and exaggerating its benefits. As understandable as that may be 
from a political perspective, forensically it inevitably creates doubt whether 
the true impact of the decision has been properly appreciated. The Minister 
cannot then complain if WKHGRFXPHQWVDUHWDNHQDWIDFHYDOXHµ 
 
6RPHZKDWVXUSULVLQJO\LQYLHZRIWKHVHZRUGV(OLDV/-ZHQWRQWRVXJJHVWWKDW´had the 
only issue been whether the Minister had properly appreciated the full impact of the 
decision on those most adversely affected, I would have been prepared to accept that she 
GLGµSDUWO\EHFDXVH´>D@V0LQLVWHUIRU'LVDEOHG3HRSOHVKHZRXOGKDYHNQRZQDQG
XQGHUVWRRGWKHREMHFWLYHVRIWKHIXQGµDQGEHFDXVH´WKHUHZDVHYLGHQFHWKDWVKH
consulted personally with many affected groups and I have no doubt that evidence of 
KDUGFDVHVZRXOGKDYHEHHQIRUFHIXOO\GUDZQWRKHUDWWHQWLRQµ78 %XWWKHUHZDV´VLPSO\
QRPDWHULDOIURPZKLFKRQHFDQSURSHUO\LQIHUWKDWµWKH0LQLVWHUKDG´SURSHUO\
appreciated and addressed the full scope and import of the matters which she is obliged 
WRFRQVLGHUSXUVXDQWWRWKH36('«$YDJXHDZDUHQHVVWKDWVKHRZHGOHJDOGXWLHVWRWKH
GLVDEOHGZRXOGQRWVXIILFHµDQGWKHIDFWWKDWVKHKDGEHHQ´DOHUW>HG@«WRWKHREOLJDWLRQ
to have regard to the matters identifiHGLQWKH(,$DQGWKH,$µZDVLQVXIILFLHQWZKHUH
those documents did not identify the various statutory needs to which due regard was 
required to be paid.79  
Elias LJ also made reference to the absence from the documentation of any reference 
to the UNCRPD ´which ought to inform the scope of the PSED with respect to the 
disabledµLQSDUWLFXODU$UWWKHUHRI´which requires states to take effective and 
appropriate measures to facilitate the right for the disabled to live in the community, a 
duty which would require where appropriate the promotion of independent livingµ80 
:KHUHDVLWZDVLQKLV/RUGVKLS·VYLHZ´UHDVRQDEOHWRDVVXPHWKDW>WKH0LQLVWHU@ZRXOGEH
                                                          
78 Ibid [76]. 
79 See also Lord Dyson MR in R (MA & Ors) v SSWP fn 56 [91]. 
80 Ibid [77]. 
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ZHOOEULHIHGRQWKHSXUSRVHDQGRSHUDWLRQRIWKHIXQGµaccepting that VKH´must be 
taken to be fully DZDUHRIKHUOHJDOGXWLHVDQGWRKDYHFRPSOLHGZLWKWKHP«ZRXOG
undermine the important role which this duty should play in governmental decision-
PDNLQJµ81 and would conflict with the PSED caselaw. 
 
(3) Timing PSED challenges 
Difficulties arise concerning the timing of PSED challenges. This is not the only area in 
which lawyers can be faced with the risk of taking action prematurely, on the one hand, 
and being regarded as having delayed unduly on the other. But the prevalence of public 
sector cuts challenges in the PSED caselaw has meant that the question regularly arises 
whether challenge should be brought to the overarching budgetary decision to reduce 
expenditure, or to subsequent decisions to make particular cuts to give effect to the 
macro decision. 
R (Fawcett Society) v HM Treasury & HMRC involved a s76A SDA challenge to the 
2010 Budget.82 The claimant challenged the failure to undertake an equality impact 
assessment of the budget as a whole. Ouseley J ruled that there was no need to assess the 
budget as a whole or, specifically, its cumulative impact, and that the government could 
wait until policy was formulated before decided whether an equality assessment is 
necessary and if so, undertaking one. In R (L) v Lancashire CC, similarly, a s49A 
DDA challenge to a budget determination was rejected as premature on the basis that 
there was no policy formulation on which it could bite.83 Mr Justice Ryder declared in R 
(D & Anor) v Manchester CC, in which the claimants argued that a failure on the part of 
the defendant to conduct an EIA in advance of the budget or otherwise to consider its 
equality implications breached the PSED,84 that the 36('´FDWHJRULFDOO\µDSSOLHGWR
budgetary decisions. But (agreeing with Kenneth Parker J in R (JG & Anor) v Lancashire 
CC85´ZKHUHIOH[LELOLW\LVEXLOWLQWRWKHEXGJHWVRWKDWVXEVHTXHQWFRUSRUDWHGHFLVLRQV
and decisions relating to individuals can still lawfully be made by reference to the 
potential impact of the proposals on the persons affected then it is possible for the duty 
to be complied with i.e. there is nothing wrong in principle with such an approach and 
QRWKLQJLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH>36('@µ86 Here, as in JGLWZDV´¶VHQVLEOHDQGlawful, for 
                                                          
81 Emphasis added. 
82 [2010] EWHC 3522 (Admin). 
83 [2011] EWHC 2331 (Admin). 
84 [2012] EWHC 17 (Admin). 
85 [2011] EWHC 2295 (Admin) [2011] LGR 909. 
86 Ibid [59]-[60]. 
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the Defendant first to formulate budget proposals and then, at the time of developing 
the policies that are now under challenge, to consider the specific impact of proposed 
SROLFLHVWKDWPLJKWEHLPSOHPHQWHGZLWKLQWKHEXGJHWDU\IUDPHZRUN·µ87 aOWKRXJK´DQex 
post facto rationalisation which seeks to excuse an adverse effect subsequently identified is 
not the same as and will not pass as a substitute for due regard being had at the time 
ZKHQWKHEXGJHWZDVDSSURYHGµ88 
In R (Barrett) v Lambeth LBC, by contrast, Ouseley J allowed a s149 EA challenge to a 
decision to cut funding to a charity which provided services in the defendant local 
DXWKRULW\·VDUHDWRSHRSOHZLWKOHDUQLQJGLVDELOLWLHV89 Where (as in Barrett) a budgetary 
decision was final and dLGQRWLQYROYHDQ\´JHQHUDOGHOHJDWHGDXWKRULW\WRUHGXFHDFXWLQ
RQHDUHDRIDGHSDUWPHQWDWWKHH[SHQVHRIDODUJHUFXWLQDQRWKHUµ90 the PSED applied 
to it (by contrast with the position as he found it in the Fawcett case): ´It is impossible to 
avoid tKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHEXGJHWDU\GHFLVLRQZDVWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKHFRXQFLO·V
functions. The equality duty was clearly engaged since the decision concerned the type of 
services which would be cut or reprovided ... It follows that unless the regard had by 
offLFHUVFDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHFRXQFLORUV«QRGXHUHJDUGFDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKH
FRXQFLOWRWKHGLVDELOLW\HTXDOLW\GXW\µ 91 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the PSED imposes continuing obligations on 
decision makers. In R (Bracking & Ors) v SSWP Blake J rejected a PSED challenge to the 
decision of the defendant to close the Independent Living Fund (ILF) by which support 
had previously been provided to people with disabilities.92 That decision was overruled 
by the Court of Appeal.93 What is of interHVWLQWKHSUHVHQWFRQWH[WKRZHYHULV%ODNH-·V
statement that: 
´DVWKHILIWKBrown principle explains, the public sector equality duty is a 
continuing one, and the express terms of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities [UNCRPD] ma\ZHOOQHHGGXHFRQVLGHUDWLRQDQG«
reflection [upon] by public bodies developing and implementing the policy of 
closure taken in this case. If the intended legislative reform set out in the White 
Paper is stalled or diluted, if the intended Code of Guidance to ease transition 
does not arrive in time or turns out to be too anaemic in content to enable the 
Convention principles to be brought to bear in individual cases, the application 
                                                          
87 Ibid [61] citing JG v Lancashire fn 85 above [52] per Kenneth Parker J. Ryder J also relied at [60] on the 
approach of Ouseley J in Fawcett fn 82 above. 
88 Ibid [62]. See also R (Nash) v Barnet LBC [2013] EWHC 1067 (Admin). 
89 [2012] EWHC 4557 (Admin), [2012] LGR 299. 
90 Ibid [97]. See also R (Rotherham MBC & Anor) v SSBIS [2014] EWHC 232 (Admin), [2014] LGR 389 [91]. 
91 Ibid [99]. 
92 [2013] EWHC 897 (Admin). 
93 [2013] EWCA Civ 1345, discussed below. 
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of the PSED may need to be revisited in the light of these developments. 
Similarly, this will need to be the case if the level of Treasury funding for disabled 
people generally or for this class of ILF users in transition back to the statutory 
scheme in particular is so austere as to leave no option but to reverse progress 
alreDG\DFKLHYHGLQLQGHSHQGHQWOLYLQJµ94 
 
´'HOHJDWLRQµGXWLHVDQG´GXHUHJDUGµ 
As mentioned above, in Brown the Divisional Court suggested that the duty of due regard 
ZDV´QRQ-GHOHJDEOHµ95 In Domb 6HGOH\/-VWDWHGWKDW&RXQFLOPHPEHUV·´KHDY\UHOLDQ>FH@
RQRIILFHUVµPDGHLW´GRXEO\LPSRUWDQWIRURIILFHUVQRWVLPSO\WRWHOOPHPEHUVZKDWWKH\
ZDQWWRKHDUEXWWREHULJRURXVLQERWKLQTXLULQJDQGUHSRUWLQJWRWKHPµDQGFULWLFLVHG
WKHHTXDOLW\DQDO\VLVE\RIILFHUVLQWKDWFDVHDV´3DQJORVVLDQµLQSDUWV96 
In the Barrett case Ouseley J ruled that the decision-maker, rather than officers, had to 
have due regard to the statutory needs in order to comply with the PSED.97 There, in a 
case in which the defendant had chosen to consider the equality implications of its 
decision making through an EIA,98 Ouseley J rejected the suggestion that the decision 
PDNHUVWKHUHWKHFRXQFLOORUV´FRXOGQRWUHDOLVWLFDOO\KDYHEHHQJLYHQDOOWKH(,$VWR
read and absorb for all the budgetary decisions which required full EIAs, and therefore 
the process, if it was adopted in reality, of leaving the due regard to officers had to be 
ODZIXOµ7KHSURYLVLRQRID´IDLUVXPPDU\µWRFRXQFLOORUVPLJKWKDYHEHHQVXIILFLHQW
´EXWLWZRXOGKDYHWRFRYHUWKHHVVHQWLDOIHDWXUHVRIKRZWKHGXW\ZDVEHLQJIXOILOOHGµ99 
In R (Essex CC) v SS Education, changes in funding of early learning which resulted in 
the removal of funding from projects to which the claimant was contractually committed 
were challenged on the basis, inter aliaRIWKHGHIHQGDQW·Valleged non-compliance with 
the race and disability PSEDs.100 Mitting J adopted the summary of the Brown principles 
set out by Holman J in R (Luton BC) v SS Education,101 but qualified what he classified as 
                                                          
94 A similar approach was adopted by the Divisional Court in R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 
218 (Admin) [2014] IRLR 266 [89] and see also R (Bapio Action Ltd) v Royal College of GPs & Anor [2014] 
EWHC 1416 (Admin) [29]. The Court in Unison VWDWHGWKDW´If it turns out that over the ensuing months 
the fees regime as introduced is having a disparate effect on those falling within a protected class, the Lord 
Chancellor would be under a duty to take remedial measures to remove that disparate effect and cannot 
GHQ\WKDWREOLJDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWFKDOOHQJHVFRPHWRRODWH«µ7KHIROORZLQJPRQWKWKHVWDWLVWLFV
showed a 79% reduction in tribunal claims. Permission to appeal has been granted by the Court of Appeal. 
95 Fn 33 above [94]. 
96 Fn 34 above [79]. 
97 Fn 89 above. 
98 This is not, of course, required but where the EIA is relied upon it must be capable of founding a 
PSED-compliant decision if the decision itself is to comply with s149.  
99 Ibid [101]. 
100 [2012] EWHC 1460. 
101 Fn 38 [104]. 
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DQRWKHUZLVH´XQFRQWURYHUVLDOVXPPDU\µ102 the statement in Luton [104(iv)] WKDW´¶7KH
GXW\LVQRQGHOHJDEOH·µE\TXRWLQJWKHPRUHH[WHQVLYHVWDWHPHQWRISULQFLSOHLQBrown 
[94] (see * above). 0LWWLQJ-VXJJHVWHGWKDW$LNHQV/-´ZDVQRWSXUSRUWLQJWRRYHUULGHRU
in any way qualify the long-established principle that central government acts not 
personally by a Secretary of State but by a Secretary of State advised by numerous 
RIILFLDOVµ103 5DWKHUZKDWZDV´SURKLELWHGVXEMHFWWRWKHTXDOLILFDWLRQVLGHQWLILHGE\
Aikens LJ, is the delegation of that responsibility to outsiders, whether they be another 
GHSDUWPHQWRIVWDWHRUSXEOLFDXWKRULW\RUSULYDWHFRQFHUQµ104 In the instant case, Mitting 
J ruled that the Secretary of State had breached the PSED by failing to consider ´HLWKHU
SHUVRQDOO\RUE\KLVRIILFLDOVµ´the overall impact of cuts in [early years] funding in Essex 
RULQORFDODXWKRULWLHVJHQHUDOO\µ105  
The Divisional Court rejected the PSED challenge in R (FDA & Ors) v SSWP & 
AnorZKLFKLQYROYHGWRWKHGHIHQGDQW·VGHFLVLRQWRXVHWKHUHWDLOSULFHLQGH[UDWKHUWKDQ
the consumer price index in uprating public sector pensions in part on the basis (per Elias 
LJ) that the Treasury, which had the power of veto over the up-rating order, had 
FRPSOLHGZLWKWKH36('DQG´LWZRXOGEHHOHYDWLQJIRUPRYHUVXEVWDQFHWRUHTXLUHWKH
Secretary of State to do so as welOµ106 Just as the principles in Carltona Ltd v Works 
Comrs107 allowed a minister to rely on workings and a review of effects carried out within 
KLVGHSDUWPHQWWRVDWLVI\WKH´GXHUHJDUGµUHTXLUHPHQWRIWKH36('VRWKHGXW\FRXOG
be discharged if the minister ´FDQEHVDWLVILHGWKDWWKHUHOHYDQWHTXDOLW\DVVHVVPHQWKDV
been carried out by another government department as well or better placed than his 
own to undertake the task, particularly where that other department has policy 
responsibility in relation to thHHIIHFWVXQGHUUHYLHZµ 
 
5. Uncertainties 
Some of the uncertainties that surround the judicial application of the PSED are 
apparent from the foregoing. In particular, the decisions of Supperstone J in the CPAG 
and Sheffield cases appear to set the bar fairly low as regards the degree of analysis 
required of decision makers, and appear to contrast not only with decisions such as those 
of Blake J in Rahman, Lang J in Isle of Wight and Walker J in W v Birmingham but also with 
                                                          
102 Ibid [41]. 
103 Fn 100 above [42] adopting Lord Greene MR in Carltona v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560, 
563.  
104 Ibid [42].  
105 Ibid [45]-[47]. 
106 [2011] EWHC 3175 (Admin) [89]. 
107 Fn 102. 
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that of the Court of Appeal in Bracking. It is never easy to predict the degree of 
information gathering and analysis will be required of decision-makers.  In addition to 
these uncertainties are those generated by a number of cases which appear to suggest 
that the PSED has little or no impact to particular categories of decision-making. An 
early example was the decision in Smith, mentioned above, which involved a challenge to 
enforcement action against a group of gypsies.108 Ouseley J was satisfied that the matters 
relevant to s71 RRA had been mainstreamed into and properly considered in the 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHGHIHQGDQW·VSODQQLQJSROLF\$VLPLODUDSSURDFKZDVWDNHQLQWKH
influential case of Baker, considered above and in Defence Estates v JL.109 There Collins J 
JUDQWHGDQRUGHUIRUSRVVHVVLRQGHFODULQJWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW´recognises that [the 
claimant] is disabled and has recognised at all material times that they must assist, so far 
as they are able, in helping her to find suitable alternative accommodation... But to 
suggest that s 49A enables someone who otherwise would fail to have any defence to a 
SRVVHVVLRQRUGHUQRQHWKHOHVVWRUHPDLQLVWRWDNHWKDWPXFKWRRIDUµ110  
Most notable of this line of decisions is that of the Supreme Court in R (McDonald) v 
RB Kensington & Chelsea rejecting by a majority a s49A DDA challenge to a decision in 
UHVSHFWRIWKHIXQGLQJRIWKHFODLPDQW·VDGXOWVRFLDOFDUHSDFNDJH111 Lord Brown, with 
ZKRPWKHPDMRULW\DJUHHGFDWHJRULVHGDV´KRSHOHVVµWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW·V
failure to make reference to that provision in its documentation amounted to a failure to 
FRPSO\ZLWKWKH36('´:KHUHDVKHUHWKHSHUVRQFRQFHUQHGLVex hypothesi disabled 
and the public authority is discharging its functions under statutes which expressly direct 
their attention to the needs of disabled persons, it may be entirely superfluous to make 
express reference to s 49A and absurd to infer from an omission to do so a failure on the 
DXWKRULW\·VSDUWWRKDYHUHJDUGWRWKHLUJHQHUDOGXW\XQGHUWKHVHFWLRQ7KDW,DPVDWLVILed, 
is the position here.µ112 
McDonald is regularly relied upon by defendants to suggest that the PSED does not 
apply to particular types of decision-making. This is not, however, correct and a careful 
reading of McDonald (as of Smith, Baker and other similar cases) indicates that, as Lord 
Brown went on to point out in McDonald´>W@KHTXHVWLRQLVRQHRIVXEVWDQFHQRWRI
                                                          
108 Fn 30. 
109 [2009] EWHC 1049 (Admin). Cf the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Norton fn 23. 
110 Ibid [23]. See, similarly, A v North Somerset Council [2009] EWHC 3060 (Admin), though the decision 
there under challenge was quashed on other grounds; R (AC) v Berkshire West PCT [2010] EWHC 1162 
(Admin), (2010) 116 BMLR 125; R (AM) v Birmingham CC [2009] EWHC 688 (Admin); R (Broster) v Wirral 
MBC [2010] EWHC 3086 (Admin); R (MS) v Oldham MBC [2010] EWHC 802 (Admin). 
111 [2011] UKSC 33 [2011] 4 All ER 881. 
112 Ibid [24]. 
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IRUPµ7KXVLQFDVHVVXFKDVWKHVHthe nature of the consideration engaged in by a 
defendant pursuant to the statutory framework within which a decision was reached 
sufficed in substance to satisfy the PSED even though no conscious consideration was 
given to that duty (and whether or not the decision maker was aware of it as such113). 
That is far from establishing, however, that the PSED does not apply to categories of 
decision-making such as planning or individual social care matters. So, for example, in R 
(JL (A Child)) v Islington LBC DFKDOOHQJHWRWKHDXWKRULW\·VGHFLVLRQWDNHQZLWKRXW
UHIHUHQFHWRV$''$WRFDSWKHVXSSRUWDYDLODEOHIURPFKLOGUHQ·VVHUYLFHVWRWKH
claimant succeeded.114 And in R (Harris) v LB Haringey the Court of Appeal quashed a 
grant of planning permission permitting demolition and redevelopment of an area 
predominantly comprising local BME independent traders and residents.115 In that case, 
unlike in Baker, the relevant statutory needs (the promotion of equality of opportunity 
between persons of different racial groups and good relations between such groups) were 
QRWLQFRUSRUDWHGZLWKLQWKHGHIHQGDQW·VSODQQLQJSROLFLHVDQGKDGQRWEHHQRWKHUZLVH
referred to in the decision making process.116 The PSED was not ´DJHQHUDOGXW\ZKHQ
taking decisions to improve the lot RIHWKQLFPLQRULW\FRPPXQLWLHVµEXWZDV´DGXW\
ZKHQWDNLQJGHFLVLRQVWRKDYHGXHUHJDUGWRWKUHHVSHFLILFQHHGVµ«7KHFRXQFLO
policies to which reference has been made may be admirable in terms of proposing 
assistance for ethnic minority communities, and it can be assumed that they are, but they 
GRQRWDGGUHVVVSHFLILFDOO\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVLPSRVHGXSRQWKHFRXQFLOE\Vµ 117 
The Court of Appeal in Pieretti v Enfield LBC relied on this dicta in rejecting the 
GHIHQGDQW·VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHPSED applied only to matters of general policy,118 ruling it 
was of relevance, inter aliaLQUHODWLRQWR´WKHSULRULW\RIQHHGWKHLQWHQWLRQDOLW\RI
KRPHOHVVQHVVDQGWKHVXLWDELOLW\RIDFFRPPRGDWLRQµ119 where, again by contrast with 
                                                          
113 There is certainly no obligation, contrary to the suggestion made by the Prime Minister in November 
2012 in which he SURPLVHGWR´FDOOWLPHµRQHTXDOLW\LPSDFWDVVHVVPHQWV http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ uk-politics-
20400747, that public authorities are required to produce EIAs of proposed decisions, though such EIAs 
may be useful to document the analysis of the equality implications of decision-making which may be 
required by the PSED. 
114 Fn 37. 
115 Fn 50. 
116 Ibid [39]. 
117 Ibid [8], [39]. Ibid [8], [39]. Note, however, that in particular cases there may not be, as Lord Dyson MR 
pointed out in R (MA & Ors) v SSWP fn 56 [91], ´DQ\practical difference between what was required by the 
YDULRXVGXWLHVµRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV 
118 [2010] EWCA Civ 1104, [2011] 2 All ER 642. 
119 Ibid [31]. See Swan Housing Association Ltd v Gill [2013] EWCA Civ 1566 in which the Court of Appeal 
ruled that a District Judge had erred in finding that the appellant had breached the PSED by seeking 
injunctive relief against the respondent, a supported tenant who claimed to suffer from dyslexia and 
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Baker, the relevant provisionVRIKRXVLQJODZGLGQRW´DGGUHVVHVWKHULJKWVDQGQHHGVRI
the disabled so comprehensively that there is no room for introduction into the scheme 
IRUPDNLQJSURYLVLRQIRUWKHKRPHOHVVRIIXUWKHUSURWHFWLRQµE\V$''$$FFRUGLQJ
to Wilson LJ, for the couUW´7KHSDUWRI>WKHGXW\@ZLWKZKLFKZHDUHFRQFHUQHGLV
GHVLJQHGWRVHFXUHWKHEULJKWHULOOXPLQDWLRQRIDSHUVRQ·VGLVDELOLW\VRWKDWWRWKHH[WHQW
WKDWLWEHDUVXSRQKLVULJKWVXQGHURWKHUODZVLWDWWUDFWVDIXOODSSUDLVDOµ 
There are, however, some types of decisions which, by their nature, are regarded by 
the courts as requiring little or no attention to be paid to equalities issues, and others 
which are more rather than less likely to be regarded by the courts as having 
incorporated the necessary attention to the PSED.120 One example is R (Greenwich 
Community Law Centre) v Greenwich LBC, in which the Court of Appeal stated, per Elias LJ, 
WKDW´>D@change from one provider to another without more will not usually engage 
HTXDOLW\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVµ121 That case concerned a decision to reallocate funding for free 
legal advice and assistance between Law Centres, no evidence having been provided 
´WKDW>WKH&ODLPDQW·V@FOLHQWVKDYHEHHQGLVDGYDQWDJHGRUFRXOGQRWWUDQVIHUWRWKHQHZ
SURYLGHUµ122 )XUWKHU´WKHZKROHSXUSRVHRI>WKHGHIHQGDQW·V@IXQGLQJOHJDODGYLFH
VHUYLFHVZDVWRDVVLVWSULRULW\JURXSVµDQGWKHFRQWUDFWDZDUGHGFRQWDLQHGVSHFLILFDWLRQV
IRUDFFHVVLELOLW\GLVDELOLW\DQGHWKQLFLW\µ123 There was no suggestion, by contrast with 
Hajrula (discussed aboveWKDWWKHZD\WKHGHIHQGDQWFKRVHWR´FXWWKHFDNHµKDG
equality implications, or (as in Kaur & Shah, also discussed above) that one provider was 
best placed to serve a particular client group.124 
In R (RB) v Devon, which concerned a PSED challenge to appoint Virgin Care as the 
preferred bidder for the provision of services under WKHGHIHQGDQW·V,QWHJUDWHG&KLOGUHQ·V
Services Scheme (ICS),125 HHJ Vosper QC stated that: ´QRWHYHU\IXQFWLRQXQGHUWDNHQE\
a public authority will engage the public sector equality duty (or putting it another way, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
$VSHUJHU·VV\QGURPHZKHUHWKHUHZDVQRHYLGHQFHRIWKRVHFRQGLWLRQVRURIDFDXVDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ
VXFKFRQGLWLRQVDQGWKHDSSHOODQW·VDFWLRQV 
120 Even leaving aside decisions, such as those reached in the exercise of a judicial function, which are 
excluded from the PSED: see R (Howard) v Official Receiver [2013] EWHC 1839 (Admin). 
121 Fn 53 [32], approving the statement of Ouseley J in Barrett fn 89 above to this effect. In R (Sanneh & 
Ors) v SSWP & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 49 [122] Arden LJ, with whom Elias LJ and Burnett J agreed so far 
as relevant here, characterised the decision in Greenwich, in common with that at issue there, as being one 
which had no effect on the claimants.  
122 [2011] EWHC 3463 (Admin) [44]. 
123 Ibid [49] and see [14]. 
124 See also Flint v CC North Yorkshire [2010] EWHC 2025 (Admin); R (Antoniou) v C&NE London NHS 
Foundation Trust & Ors [2013] EWHC 3055 (Admin). 
125 [2012] EWHC 3597 (Admin) [36]. 
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WKRXJKHQJDJHGWKHGXW\ZLOOEHLUUHOHYDQWDQGFDQEHUXOHGRXWDWWKHRXWVHWµ126 The 
judge concluded that the PSED was engaged at the stage when the decision was taken to 
retain ICS under a single provider (such equality analysis as occurred following rather 
than preceding this point), distinguishing the decision in Greenwich on the basis that, 
ZKHUHDVWKHOHJDOVHUYLFHVDWLVVXHWKHUHZHUH´ZLGHO\DQGFRQYHQWLRQDOO\VXSSOLHGµDQG
PLJKWEHSURYLGHGE\´DQy number of potential suppliers, all having skill and experience 
LQJLYLQJOHJDODGYLFHµ127 ,&6ZDVDVHUYLFH´XQLTXHWR'HYRQµDQGWKHFKDQJHLQ
SURYLGHU´ZDVDPXFKPRUHIXQGDPHQWDOFKDQJHWKDQWKDWFRQWHPSODWHGLQ
*UHHQZLFK«>KDYLQJ@WKHSRWHQWLDOWRDIIect the supply of services to vulnerable 
PHPEHUVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\PDQ\LIQRWDOORIZKRPSRVVHVVSURWHFWHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVµ 
The approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Greenwich appears to be defensible: it 
would be a triumph of form over substance if public authorities were required to engage 
in the same level of equality analysis when deciding which supplier to use for stationery 
and which services to impose budget savings upon. But bearing in mind in particular the 
three statutory needs referred to in s149 (i.e., the need to eliminate unlawful 
discrimination to advance equality and to foster good relations), it should not be too 
readily assumed that decisions which appear to have no significant equality implications 
permit a cursory approach to the PSED. An example is the decision in R (Copson) v Dorset 
Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust in which the challenge concerned a decision to 
reconfigure mental health services which had been taken after extensive consultation and 
equality analysis and which HHJ Keyser QC found had been intended for the benefit of 
mental health service users.128 The decision of the court was that, in the circumstances, 
the flaws in the EIA upon which the defendant relied did not render the decision 
inconsistent with the PSED. HHJ Keyser QC went on to suggest that, where the very 
SROLF\DWLVVXHFRQFHUQHG´WKHSURYLVLRQRIVHUYLFHVWRSHUVRQVZLWKDUHOHYDQWSURWHFWHG
FKDUDFWHULVWLFLHGLVDELOLW\«WKHUHOHYDQWSURWHFWHGFKaracteristic was the reason for the 
SURYLVLRQRIVHUYLFHVWRWKHPµDQG´WKHYHU\GHFLVLRQ>XQGHUFKDOOHQJHFRQFHUQHG@WKH
proper balance between a diminution in choice and control of those with the relevant 
protected characteristic (ie adult community care service users) in favour of a reduction 
                                                          
126 Ibid [36]. Cf R (LB Lewisham) v AQA [2013] EWHC 211 (Admin) [146] ²[148]. See similarly Greenwich fn 
53 above [30] to [32]. R (BAPIO) (2014), fn 94 above, raised the interesting question whether the PSED 
could require an authority to exercise a function it was not presently exercising. Mitting J ruled that it could 
not but granted permission to appeal.  
127 Ibid [59]. 
128 This, like Barrett, fn 89, was a case in which the defendant relied closely on the EIA in connection with 
its alleged compliance with the PSED. 
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RISXELFH[SHQGLWXUH>VLF@«WKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIWKH«GHFLVLRQPDNHVWKH&ODLPDQW·V
FRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKH&DELQHWIDLOHGWRKDYHGXHUHJDUGUDWKHUOHVVSODXVLEOHµ. He accepted, 
however, WKDW´LWGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULly follow that the [defendant] had due regard to the 
QHHGWRDGYDQFHHTXDOLW\RIRSSRUWXQLW\µ129  
The caselaw makes it clear, more generally, that it is dangerous to proceed too quickly 
to any conclusion that, because a decision by its nature impacts in particular on groups of 
people defined by reference to one or more of the protected characteristics, the PSED 
requirements are incorporated into the framework for such decision-making. In R (Sefton 
Care Association & Ors) v Sefton Council, the Administrative Court ruled that the defendant 
was not obliged to comply with the PSED in setting fees payable to the providers of 
residential care, this because the defendant was required in any event by the relevant 
statutory guidance130 to fix the fees with due regard to the actual cost of providing such 
care.131 In R (South West Care Homes Ltd & Ors) v Devon CC, however, Judge Jarman QC 
accepted, contrary to the decision in Sefton, that the PSED did apply to decisions on 
residential care home fees.132  
The defendant in the South West Care Homes case had set fees for 2012-13 at a level 
which the claimants contended allowed a zero rate of return to capital, this with the 
effect that residents funded by the defendant were not covering their costs. HHJ Jarman 
QC referred to the obligations imposed by the UNCRPD, pointed out that the 
conclusions in Sefton on the PSED were obiter,133 ruled that the PSED applied to the 
GHIHQGDQW·VIXQFWLRQRIDUUDQJLQJWKHSURYLVLRQRIDFFRPPRGDWLRQDQGFDUHto the 
elderly and inform DQGWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQRQIHHUDWHV´PD\DGYHUVHO\DIIHFWUHVLGHQWVµ134 
DQGUHMHFWHGWKHGHIHQGDQW·VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHIHHVHWWLQJH[HUFLVHZDV´UHPRWHµIURP
WKHGHIHQGDQW·VSURYLVLRQRIDFFRPPRGDWLRQAnd in R (Rotherham MBC & Anor) v 
SSBIS Stewart J accepted that the defendant had breached the PSED by failing to 
consider the equality impacts of changes in the distribution of EU regional funds, there 
being evidence that the decision had a disparate effect on people with disabilities.135 
Rejecting the GHIHQGDQW·VVXEPLVVLRQWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQVLQWKHFawcett case and in JG v 
                                                          
129 [2013] EWHC 732 (Admin) [59] though cf the case-specific comments of Lord Dyson MR in MA, fn 56 
above. 
130 LAC (2004) 20. 
131 [2011] EWHC 2676 (Admin) [100].  
132 [2012] EWHC 2967 (Admin) and see R (South Tyneside Care Home Owners) v South Tyneside [2013] EWHC 
1827 (Admin) to similar effect. 
133 Ibid [144]. Similarly that in R (East Midlands Care Ltd) v Leicestershire CC [2011] EWHC 3096 (Admin). 
134 Ibid [33]. 
135 Fn 90 [92]-[93]. 
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Lancashire LQGLFDWHGWKDW´where high level decisions are being taken as to budget levels or 
a spending envelope, detailed assessment of Equality Impact may be neither appropriate 
noUSRVVLEOHµFRQFOXGLQJWKDW´LQERWK>RIWKHVH@FDVHVLWZDVDQHVVHQWLDOSDUWRIWKH
MXGLFLDOUHDVRQLQJWKDWWKHSXEOLFDXWKRULW\·VGHFLVLRQZDVQRWDILQDORQHDQGWKDWWKH
36('FRXOGEHFDUULHGRXWIXUWKHUGRZQWKHOLQHµZKHUHDVLQWKLVFDVHWKHDOORcations 
XQGHUFKDOOHQJHZHUH´LQQRVHQVHSUHOLPLQDU\RUSURYLVLRQDOµ136 )XUWKHU´>W@KHIDFWWKDW
the individual regions would themselves have to consider the PSED when deciding how 
WRXVHWKHIXQGVDOORFDWHGWRWKHPFDQQRWDEVROYHWKH'HIHQGDQWIURPWKH36('µLQ
relation to its own functions.137 
 
6. Conclusions 
As is clear from the discussion of the caselaw above, the PSED has the potential to reach 
into much public sector decision making. Many PSED challenges have been concerned 
with funding cuts and the service changes resulting therefrom. Interpreting WKH´FXWVµ
category fairly broadly to include all expenditure-driven decisions, the success rate of 
such challenges which have reached full hearing has been just under 40% (see table at **), 
an impressive figure in view of the general judicial reticence when it comes to interfering 
with socio-economic decision-making. It would be difficult to assert that the PSED has 
made any significant difference to the fact that the cuts have impacted disproportionately 
on those disadvantaged by sex, disability and/or ethnicity. But it has begun to require 
that decision-makers establish and confront, rather than turn a blind eye, to those 
impacts and it is this which may produce different outcomes in the longer term. 
PSED challenges falling outside thH´FXWVµ category have been mainly concerned with 
planning enforcement (in particular, the impact thereof on gypsies/ travellers138), 
immigration matters including detention139 and prison/ Young Offender Institution 
related challenges.140 Notable victories have included Harris, discussed above, a rare 
example of such in a planning case, and the securing of declarations that Home Office 
                                                          
136 Ibid [88]-[89]. 
137 Ibid [91]. 
138 R (Casey) v Crawley BC & Ors [2006] EWHC 301 (Admin), [2006] LGR 239; Smith fn 31; Baker fn 28; R 
(McCarthy) v Basildon DC [2009] EWCA Civ 13 [2009] LGR 1013; 2·%ULHQY6RXWK&DPEV'&[2008] EWCA 
Civ 1159, [2009] LGR 141; Stokes v LB Brent [2009] EWHC 1426 (QB); Harris fn 50; Broxbourne BC v Robb 
& Ors [2011] EWHC 1626 (QB); Medhurst v SSCLG [2011] EWHC 3576 (Admin); Burton v SSCLG [2012] 
EWHC 3254 (Admin). 
139 BAPIO fn 20; Medical Justice fn 38; R (BE) v SSHD [2011] EWHC 690 (Admin), R (HA (Nigeria)) fn 23, 
R (D) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 2501 (Admin). 
140 R (Primrose) v SSJ fn 63; R(C) v SSJ fn 22; R (EHRC) v SSJ [2010] EWHC 147 (Admin); R (S) v SSJ 
[2012] EWHC 1810 (Admin), [2013] 1 All ER 66; R(T) v SSJ [2013] EWHC 1119 (Admin); Griffiths & Anor 
v SSJ [2013] EWHC 4077 (Admin). 
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policies on the removal of detainees, and policies and practice on the detention of people 
with mental illness pending their deportation, were unlawful.141 There have also been 
victories in PSED challenges to provisions permitting the use of physical restraints on 
young offenders (R (C) v SSJ, discussed at ** above), removal arrangements for foreign 
prisoners and the provision of bail hostels for women prisoners.142 Other successful 
challenges from among the smorsgabord of PSED cases have included R (Watkins-Singh) 
Y$EHUGDUH*LUOV·+LJK6FKRRO, a challenge to a rigid school uniform policy which precluded 
the wearing of a narrow steel kara bangle by a Sikh schoolgirl;143 R (E) v JFS (in respect 
RIWKHGHIHQGDQW·Vfailure to consider the equality implications of its admissions policy);144 
Lunt, Easai145 and Pieretti considered above (challenges to taxi specifications, NICE drugs 
guidance and a homelessness decision respectively).  
The relative significance in the overall body of PSED caselaw of cuts cases has had 
the effect that much of the analysis has been focused on the first of the statutory equality 
needs (the elimination of discrimination), there being limited scope in reducing public 
spending positively to promote or(, more recently,) to advance equality and foster good 
relations.146 Having said this, the PSED caselaw appears to have helped to shift the 
judicial conceptualisation of equality/ non-discrimination as being concerned with the 
avoidance of treatment which differentiates in form or substance, to something with a 
more radical edge. In Kaur & Shah, discussed above, the defendant sought to argue that 
its continued funding of the Southall Black Sisters would have entailed unlawful race 
discrimination. Moses LJ, in rejecting this submission, relied on s35 RRA which 
permitted the provision of access to facilities or services to persons of a particular racial 
group where the facilitieVRUVHUYLFHV´PHHWWKHVSHFLDOQHHGVRISHUVRQVRIWKDWJURXSLQ
UHJDUGWRWKHLUHGXFDWLRQWUDLQLQJRUZHOIDUHRUDQ\DQFLOODU\EHQHILWVµ5HIXVLQJWRUHDG
that provision strictly as an exception to the principle of equality, as was urged upon him 
by the defendant, his Lordship declared that s35 was ´not an exception to the [RRA]. It 
does not derogate from it in any way. It is a manifestation of the important principle of 
                                                          
141 Respectively R (Medical Justice) v SSHD fn 38 and R (HA (Nigeria)) fn 23 (and see R (BE) v SSHD, R (D) 
v SSHD fn 202).  
142 Respectively R (EHRC) v SSJ and Griffiths. Unsuccessful prisoner cases include Primrose, R (S) v SSJ and 
R(T) v SSJ, all fn 203. 
143 [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin) [2008] 3 FCR 203. 
144 Fn 23. 
145 See similarly R (Servier Laboratories Ltd) v NICE [2009] EWHC 281 (Admin), 108 BMLR 1. 
146 Cf Harris fn 50 in which the planning decision, which related to an area comprising predominantly local 
Turkish, Cypriot, Latin American and Afro Caribbean independent traders and BME-occupied housing, 
ZDVIODZHGE\WKHGHIHQGDQW·VIDLOXUHWRtake account of the statutory needs to promote equality of 
opportunity between persons of different racial groups and good relations between such groups. 
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anti discrimination and equality measures that not only must like cases be treated alike 
EXWWKDWXQOLNHFDVHVEXWPXVWEHWUHDWHGGLIIHUHQWO\µ147 He went on to rule that there 
ZDV´no dichotomy between the promotion of equality and cohesion and the provision 
RIVSHFLDOLVWVHUYLFHVWRDQHWKQLFPLQRULW\µDQGWKDW´LQFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHV the 
purposes of [the PSED] and the relevant statutory code may only be met by specialist 
VHUYLFHVIURPDVSHFLDOLVWVRXUFHµ148 
Kaur, although reached over thirty years after the enactment of the RRA, was one of 
very few examples of cases in which that provision fell to be judicially considered, much 
less determined the outcome.149 It is unlikely to have been a coincidence that the non-
formalistic approach to equality was taken in a case in which the relevant duty was to 
´have due regard to the need³ (a) to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and (b) to 
promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial 
JURXSVµHPSKDVLVDGGHG:LWKWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH(TXDOLW\$FWWKH
PSED·VUHIHUHQFHWRWKHpromotion of equality was replaced with a requirement to have 
due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity.150 There is, as yet, no 
indication that the courts regard this difference as material, and the caselaw which has 
developed under s149 has been on all fours with the approach taken under the 
predecessor provisions. But any assumption that the reference to equality of opportunity 
DVGLVWLQFWIURP´HTXDOLW\RIUHVXOWVµ´HTXDOLW\RIRXWFRPHµRUVLPSO\´HTXDOLW\µLVPHDQW
to indicate a symmetrical approach to concept is contradicted by s149(3) which provides 
in terms that:  
(3) Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between 
persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do 
not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to-- 
(a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a 
relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that characteristic; 
(b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not 
share it; 
(c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to 
                                                          
147 Fn 35 [52]. 
148 Ibid [55]-[56]. 
149 The provision was referred to in R (Stephenson) v Stockton-on-Tees BC  [2005] 1 FCR 165 [28] but, any 
discrimination there at issue being indirect, was unnecessary (a justification defence being available). In E v 
JFS fn 23 [176], Munby J advocated a narrow approach to s.35, though his remarks were obiter. The 
provision was mentioned in Conwell v Newham LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1 and in Lambeth LBC v CRE [1990] ICR 
768 but in neither case was it substantively considered.  
150 ´7KH3XEOLF6HFWRU(TXDOLW\'XW\µIndustrial Law Journal 405, 410. The duty is also discussed by 
Tom Hickman in Too hot, too cold or just right? The development of the public sector equality duties in 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZµPublic Law 325. 
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participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by 
such persons is disproportionately low. 
 
As stated above, the application of the PSED to austerity decision-making is not the 
most promising context for the advancement of equality as distinct from the avoidance 
of discrimination. Having said this, in the Chavda case, which involved a challenge to a 
decision to ration adult care services to those whose care needs ZHUHGHHPHG´FULWLFDOµ151 
-XGJH0DFNLH4&PDGHVSHFLILFUHIHUHQFHWR´WKHQHHGWRSURPRWHHTXDOLW\RI
opportunity and to take account of disabilities even where that involves treating the 
disabled more favourably than othersµHPSKDVLVDGGHGDQGUXOHGWKDW the failure to 
draw attention to this obligation rendered the decision unlawful. And in R (South West 
Care Homes Ltd and others) v Devon CC, a decision on care home fees was struck down in 
SDUWEHFDXVHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW·VIDLOXUHWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHSotential impact on the 
rights of residents under the UNCRPD ´to choose where they live and to have support 
VRDVWRSUHYHQWLVRODWLRQRUVHJUHJDWLRQIURPWKHFRPPXQLW\µ.152 In the latter case the 
judge relied on the decision in Burnip & Ors v SSWP153 in which the Court of Appeal had 
ruled, on the strength of the (&W+5·Vdecision in Thlimmenos v Greece,154 that the 
GHIHQGDQW·VIDLOXUHWRmake allowances for the fact that the claimants needed larger 
SURSHUWLHVE\UHDVRQRIWKHLURUWKHLUFKLOGUHQ·VGLVDELOLWLHV, and were therefore placed at a 
particular disadvantage by the bedroom tax, breached Art 14.  
Chavda, South West Care Homes and Burnip all concerned people with disabilities, and 
might be seen as no more than applications of the relatively uncontroversial principle 
that the avoidance of disability discrimination may well require special treatment (this 
being the underpinning presumption of the duty to make reasonable adjustments). But 
more recently, in R (Knowles & Anor) v SSWP, Hickinbottom J applied the Burnip 
approach to a challenge to the fact that housing benefit payments in respect of the costs 
of accommodation at caravan sites are calculated by reference to ordinary sites, and did 
not allow for the additional costs associated with Gypsy sites (additional site 
management, maintenance, clearance costs, fencing and security, education facilities for 
children, resolution of disputes, and personal support, which together were estimated to 
account for about a third of the total costs).155 The judge accepted WKDW´the state may 
                                                          
151 Fn 25. 
152 Fn 132 [43]. 
153 [2012] EWCA Civ 629 [2012] LGR 954. 
154 (2001) 31 EHRR 411. 
155 [2013] EWHC 19 (Admin), [63], [76], [77]. 
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have a positive obligation to allocate a greater share of public resources to a particular 
SHUVRQRUJURXSWRDPHOLRUDWHµZKDWPLJKWEHWHUPHGDThlimmenos difference; that 
´[a]lthough very different on its facts, conceptually, this case appears to me 
indistinguishable from Burnip, in which the analysis was made in Thlimmenos WHUPVµ; and 
WKDW´[f]ollowing Burnip, there is of course no conceptual or jurisdictional difficulty in 
finding a prima facie positive obligation on the state to allocate resources to remedy such 
a difference; and then proceeding to consider the reasons for the difference and whether 
WKH\DPRXQWWRDQREMHFWLYHDQGUHDVRQDEOHMXVWLILFDWLRQµ156 The claim failed, the bulk of 
the additional costs being ineligible to be met within the housing benefit scheme, but the 
case may suggest increased judicial confidence with a non-symmetrical approach to 
equality. 
Knowles was not a PSED case and it would be wrong to suggest that all of the work in 
the area of equality law is being done by the PSED.157 It is however noteworthy that a 
duty which began with relatively limited apparent potential has proved so significant in 
practice. Perhaps most worthy of remark is the fact that the specific duties, which were 
introduced simultaneously with the race, disability and sex PSEDs, have proven to be of 
such limited impact by comparison with the PSED itself even prior to being watered 
down by the Equality Act 2010. Home Office Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
0LNH2·%ULHQWROGWKH&RPPRQV&RPPLWWHHZKLFKVFUXWLQLVHGWKH5DFH5HODWLRQV
$PHQGPHQW%LOOQRWRQO\WKDWWKDW´>W@he Bill is one of the most significant steps that 
the Government will take on race equality LQ%ULWDLQµEXWDOVRWKDW´>P@uch of the detail 
of how the general duty will operate in practice will depend on the content of th[e] 
ordersµLQWURGXFLQJWKHVSHFLILFGXWLHVIn the event, the specific duties were something 
of a damp squib, due in part perhaps to the lack of enthusiasm shown by the CRE, the 
sole body capable of enforcing the original specific duties; a 2006 report published by the 
Public Interest Research Unit suggested that the CRE had served only four compliance 
notices in connection with failures to comply with the specific duties and had taken no 
enforcement action in connection with the general duty other than by intervening in the 
Elias case, discussed above.158  
In Kaur & Shah Moses LJ relied significantly, in deciding that the respondent had 
                                                          
156 Ibid [73]. 
157 See for example the decision of the Divisional Court (Moses LJ, with whom Collins and Jay JJ agreed) 
in R (Public Law Project) v SSJ [2014] EWHC 2365 (Admin).  
158 5XSHUW+DUZRRG´7HHWKDQGWKHLU8VH (QIRUFHPHQW$FWLRQE\WKHWKUHHHTXDOLW\FRPPLVVLRQVµ
PIRU), http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/harwood-tuwnov9.pdf, accessed 7 October 2013. 
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acted unlawfully, on its failure to comply with its own policy, published in pursuit of its 
specific duties, for conducting racial equality impact assessments.159 It is also noteworthy 
that the precise finding of breach of the PSED related to the failure to carry out a race 
EIA as required by the specific duties. It has subsequently become clear that the carrying 
out of an EIA as such is not a requirement for compliance with the PSED, though 
adequate analysis, based on appropriate and sufficient information, on the equality 
impacts of decisions, practices etc is. But the removal of the specific duties which 
underpinned decisions such as Kaur & Shah has made little difference to the operation of 
the PSED itself. 
The future of the PSED itself is under threat. The Independent Steering Group 
established by the Coalition Government in May 2012 was mentioned above. The Group 
GLGQRWLQIDFWUHFRPPHQGDQ\OHJLVODWLYHFKDQJHVEHOLHYLQJLW´too early to make a final 
MXGJHPHQWDERXWWKHLPSDFWRIWKH36('µ160 for all the skeptical tone of the report it 
published in September 2013. Meanwhile, however, the Prime Minister, millionaire 
beneficiary of Eton and Oxford, had declared in a November 2012 speech to the CBI 
WKDW´ZHDUHcalling time on Equality Impact AssessmentsµDQGWKDWKHKDG´smart 
SHRSOHLQ:KLWHKDOOZKRFRQVLGHUHTXDOLWLHVLVVXHVZKLOHWKH\·UHPDNLQJWKHSROLF\µ.161 
:KDWHYHUWKHLQDGHTXDFLHVRIWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU·VJUDVSRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
EIAs and the PSED, his remarks do not bode well for the latter. This is particularly the 
case as a result of the 2015 General Election which has delivered a Conservative 
Government unconstrained by the (in this matter) moderating hand of the Liberal 
Democrats.  
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